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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability of counselors to make accurate 
diagnostic impressions has been questioned beginning with 
the seminal work of Meehl ( 1954). In fact, computer 
programs utilizing simple linear models have been found 
to provide better judgments of a client's 
picture than counselors (Goldberg, 1965) . 
reason that counselors are less accurate 
diagnostic 
One likely 
in their 
diagnostic conclusions than computers is that human 
decision-making is fraught with bias (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). 
The manner in which these biases in decision-making 
involve systematic errors in information processing has 
been studied extensively (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) 
under the heading of "cognitive heuristics." 
Cognitive heuristics are shortcuts in information 
processing that individuals use in order to simplify the 
problem-solving process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
Cognitive heuristics are necessary because they allow one 
to organize large amounts of information in a timely 
manner. However, complexity, volume, and uncertainty of 
presented information make an accurate judgment difficult 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Individuals make an "adequate" 
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decision rather than a "rational" decision based on 
presented evidence and probability (March & Simon, 1958). 
The cognitive heuristic process often results in 
judgmental error (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
After establishing the existence of cognitive 
heuristics as processes in human decision making (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1972), additional work by Tversky and 
Kahneman, identified specific types of heuristics (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1984). The representative heuristic is 
associated with making inferences about the probability 
of an occurrence by evaluating the similarity of the 
presenting situation to a familiar model or prototype 
(Heppner & Frazier, 1992). The availability heuristic is 
associated with making inferences about the probability 
of an occurrence based on the number of examples that can 
be quickly recalled (Heppner & Frazier, 1992). The 
simulation heuristic is associated with the prediction of 
an outcome by constructing hypothetical scenarios using 
the presenting information (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). The 
anchoring heuristic is associated with predicting 
behavior based on what the individual making that 
prediction would do and then modifying it to fit the 
presenting situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Metzger and 
Krass (1988) adapted the original items reported by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) to replicate the effects of 
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the representative, anchoring, and availability 
heuristics and confirmed these findings. 
Most of the research establishing cognitive 
heuristics (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) has been 
conducted using novice decision-makers (i.e., individuals 
not trained in processing social information) . What about 
the trained social information processor? In a counseling 
interview the conditions are favorable for heuristic use; 
the counselor organizes uncertain, complex, social 
information into judgments about the client. Research 
suggests that both novice and experienced counselors are 
subject to errors in clinical judgment (e.g., Crawford, 
Humfleet, Ribordy, Ho, & Vickers, 1991). Furthermore, 
differences in the conceptualization of clients according 
to level of expertise indicate that increased knowledge 
and clinical experience may effect how clients are 
diagnosed (Hammond, 1992). Given that counselors make 
heuristic errors, what are the sources of bias that 
effect the client's diagnoses? 
One potential source of bias for counselors when 
assessing a client's problems are those issues associated 
with the counselor's personal beliefs or values. One 
issue which has a high probability of personal relevance 
and increased sensitivity for counselors is sexual 
orientation. Due to the degree of homophobia in our 
society (Dupras, Levy, Samson, & Tessier, 1989), 
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counselors are not immune to the negative prejudices and 
biases our culture has inflicted upon us. This bias 
could affect the diagnostic interview in a number of ways 
because the counselor may ignore or weigh more heavily 
certain diagnostic signs and symptoms. 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the degree 
to which counselor's beliefs regarding sexual orientation 
may affect their diagnostic impressions of gay clients. 
Counselors at a high and low level of training were 
randomly assigned to read a case study where the client's 
sexual orientation (gay) was salient or not salient. 
After reading the vignette, the participants were asked 
to report their diagnostic impressions using objective 
criteria. It was hypothesized that experienced 
counselors-in-training would rate the likelihood and 
correspondent sl?.veri ty of the client having a mental 
illness less than novice counselors-in-training. 
Secondly, it was hypothesized that degree of homophobia 
was associated with likelihood of mental illness ratings 
and severity of mental illness ratings. Lastly, it was 
hypothesized that the likelihood and severity ratings of 
a client having a mental illness would be higher for the 
vignette which specified the male client as gay. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Is the trained professional immune to the common 
biases that effect how laypersons make decisions? Is 
expertise enough to elevate one's decision-making skills 
to the accuracy of statistical analysis? Research using 
expert decision-makers performing familiar tasks has 
shown that even trained professionals (i.e., lawyers) are 
subject to bias (Jackson, 1986). Al though they are 
trained social information processors, counselors may 
make biased clinical decisions (Meehl, 1954). Personal 
values and pre-existing expectations can bias judgments 
about the client. Gender, race, and sexual orientation 
are particularly sensitive to biases. It would be 
unrealistic to expect counselors to be without personal 
values, beliefs, and expectations. However, counselors 
must recognize that they are not beyond subjectivity and 
consider the consequences for the client. As a helping 
profession, counseling should avoid any unconscious 
prejudice toward the client by actively researching 
counselors' potential for and sources of judgmental 
error. 
5 
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Understanding Heuristic Research 
There has been criticism of cognitive heuristic 
research because it focuses on errors in judgment and the 
conceptualization of human beings as irrational thinkers 
(Lopes, 1991). Kahneman (1991), a pioneer of cognitive 
heuristics, addressed this criticism. He suggested that 
psychological methodology favors the study of failure in 
normative reasoning because it produces results, not 
because of a negative view of human nature. Sherman and 
Corty (1984) understood cognitive heuristic study within 
the following framework: 
"Irrationality is often a sensible decision making 
strategy given the subject's goals and understanding 
of the information. In addition, the very notion of 
error or irrationality implies a criterion of 
objective appropriateness. Such a criterion is often 
nonexistent for problems used in the study of 
heuristic use" (p. 231). 
This is consistent with the assumptions of Heller, 
Saltzstein, and caspe (1992). That is, heuristics may or 
may not lead to error, but their role in the judgment 
process contributes to further understanding of 
information processing. This framework provides the 
rationale behind heuristic research both past and 
present. 
Human Limitations and Cognitive Heuristics 
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Human beings are limited in their information 
processing capacity and do not necessarily engage in a 
formal analysis of information. Individuals may omit or 
inaccurately navigate phases of the decision-making 
process (Heppner & Frazier, 1992). The most important 
and relevant information may not be attended to, the 
context or sample size may be ignored, and the 
information may be incorrectly weighted in the 
integration process (Heppner & Frazier, 1992). Conscious 
consideration of each phase of the judgment process does 
not automatically take place (Baron, 1990). The "rules of 
thumb" employed in place of a more logical analysis have 
been termed cognitive heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972). 
The past two decades since the inception of 
cognitive heuristics have resulted in a flood of research 
on the factors that influence heuristic error (Kahneman, 
1991). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that individuals 
make errors from an overreliance on personal prototypes 
or models comprised of central tendency characteristics 
(i.e., a gay man is passive, emotional, and promiscuous, 
Page & Yee, 1986). Two groups of subjects were given 
random descriptions drawn from either of two samples, 70 
lawyers and 30 engineers or 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. 
Despite the probability differences that a description is 
that of a lawyer or an engineer, there were ·no 
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differences in the likelihood ratings between the two 
groups. Subjects based their probability ratings on the 
description's likeness to a typical lawyer or engineer 
and ignored statistical probability in the formation of 
a judgment. Information frequently and/or recently 
received may cause the decision-maker to ignore other 
information not salient (Sherman & Corty, 1984). 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (cited 
in Sherman & Corty, 1984), found that subjects judged 
death by accident more likely than death by stroke 
al though strokes account for 85% more deaths. They 
attributed this result to the frequency of accidents 
reported in the media versus the unreported incidence of 
strokes. These systematic biases have been researched in 
terms of "schema" and "salience" effects (Salovey and 
Turk, 1991). Given that human beings are limited in 
their information processing ability, it important to 
investigate their sources of error. For further 
understanding of the influence of schema and salience a 
more complete discussion is necessary. 
Self-schema 
It has been suggested that the process of clinical 
decision-making is subject to error given the unavoidable 
subjectivity of clinician (Salovey & Turk, 1991). This 
subjectivity can be understood in terms of "self-schema." 
Self-schema are comprised of personal values, beliefs, 
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pre-existing expectations, and affective responses 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Self-schema affect the cognitive 
organization of incoming social information (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). For example, degree of homophobia (self-
schema) was associated with errors in recall for 
descriptions of three Gay Society speakers (Walker & 
Antaki, 1986). Subjects with a high degree of homophobia 
were unable to differentiate between the three homosexual 
speakers. 
Self-schema influences how information is coded and 
retrieved from memory (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 
1978). Schrauger; Swann, Griffen, Predmore and Gaines; 
and Swann and Read (cited in Smith & Kida, 1991) have 
shown that information consistent with self-schema is 
more frequently recalled and viewed as more credible. 
Wyer and Martin (1986) presented subjects with two 
conflicting trait-adjective descriptions: a named 
individual and a group member. Rated expectancies of 
behavior were consistent with the information, but when 
subjects were subsequently told that the two descriptions 
were of the same individual they did not change 
expectancies of behavior. This suggests that subjects 
maintained two separate cognitive representations of the 
same individual to protect their original 
conceptualization. Schema have a tendency to remain 
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fixed despite conflicting information (Sherman & Corty, 
1984) . 
People make biased judgments because each person has 
their own beliefs, values, and expectations self-schema. 
Self-schema are organized categories of information. 
Once established, self-schema are difficult to change 
despite the presentation of inconsistent information. 
Counselors are not without self-schema and may disregard 
information about a client that is inconsistent with 
their schema. 
Salient Cues 
A salient cue is information presented recently and 
frequently (Sherman & Corty, 1984). Functionally, salient 
information triggers self-schema which in turn influences 
judgment (Salovey & Turk, 1991). Higgens, Rholes, and 
Jones (cited in Sherman & Corty, 1984) had subjects read 
a description which first presented positive (self-
confident) or negative (conceited) trait terms followed 
by identical ambiguous behavioral descriptions. The 
behaviors were viewed as positive or negative according 
to the particular salient cue presented. Wyer and Srull 
(1979, 1980) confirmed this finding and demonstrated that 
a salient cue first accessed a category of information 
and then influenced how ambiguous behaviors were 
evaluated. Subjects were asked to underline three hostile 
behaviors and construct a sentence using them. The 
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subjects then read an ambiguous vignette about an actor. 
Those who had the hostility task most recently and/or 
performed it more frequently rated hostile behaviors and 
traits about the actor more likely. In a study by Gurwitz 
and Dodge (1977), subjects were given a description of a 
fellow college student and asked to judge the likelihood 
that a certain trait applies to her. Describing the 
student as a member of a sorority (salient) with three 
trait confirming behaviors (i.e., she goes to great 
lengths to look 'just right') resulted in higher 
attribution of group oriented, social climbing, clothes 
conscious, phony, conforming, wealthy, cliquish, and 
snobbish traits than the same description without the 
word sorority (not salient). 
Research studying the effects of salient cues with 
helping professionals has demonstrated biases similar to 
those found in the general populace (e.g., Katz, Parisi, 
Astone, McEvaddy, & Lucido, 1987). Gender, race, and 
sexual orientation have been particularity effective at 
accessing self-schema with counselors (e.g., Walker & 
Antaki, 1986; Taylor & Falcone, 1982). Robertson and 
Fitzgerald (1990) used gender roles to investigate 
differences in the therapist's conceptualization of the 
problem, diagnosis, and treatment plan between a client 
description consistent or non-consistent with traditional 
gender roles. Results suggested that the client's 
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problem was rated more severely when the client was 
portrayed in non-traditional sex-roles (i.e., house 
husband). Additionally, the source of problems for the 
client with a non-traditional gender role was more likely 
to be attributed to the client's marriage than the 
client's personal issues. 
Crawford et al. (1991) presented clinical and 
counseling psychologists with identical vignettes of a 
homosexual or heterosexual, AIDS or leukemia patient. In 
order to investigate the effects of sexual orientation on 
empathy and understanding, participants rated their 
likelihood to accept them for treatment, to make physical 
contact, and to believe the client was deserving of 
sympathy. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
found main effects for disease and univariate F tests 
indicated that subjects rating an AIDS patient were less 
likely to accept the client, to make physical contact, 
and more likely to refer to another therapist. An 
additional MANOVA yielded main effects for level of 
homophobia with regard to willingness to make physical 
contact and interpersonal interaction with the gay 
client. 
Salient cues are pieces of information that tap into 
self-schema. As a result, the subjective schema that is 
triggered becomes a reference for subsequent judgments. 
Counselors are susceptible to such salient information as 
13 
gender, race, and sexual orientation which is laden with 
personal values, beliefs, and expectancies. Research 
suggests that these particularly sensitive self-schema 
may influence the diagnoses and treatment of the client. 
Expertise 
Defined in terms of schema, experts have greater 
breadth and depth of knowledge in a particular area 
(Gebotys & Claxton-Oldfield, 1989). Research suggests 
that degree of expertise effects how information is 
processed (e.g., Waxman, et al, 1991). Smith and Kida 
(1991) found that both expert and student auditors 
exhibited biases in judgment, but the extent and severity 
of biases in expert auditors were less. 
Toward further understanding of the relationship 
between expertise and information processing, Heller, et 
al. (1992) studied first, second, and third year medical 
residents. Third year residents predisposed themselves 
to error by relying on cognitive heuristics more often 
than first or second year medical residents when making 
diagnoses. This was exemplified in their greater 
disregard for utilizing base rate information. However, 
more experienced residents had greater variability than 
first-year residents in the prototype or 
conceptualization of the patient as evidenced by less 
redundant information cited in support of the diagnoses. 
This suggests that experts are prone to judgmental error 
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as a result of increased reliance on cognitive 
heuristics, but access more developed schemata than those 
with less expertise. 
Research specific to counseling has yielded results 
consistent with novice-expert data. Expert clinicians 
conceptualize clients in less distinct categories than 
novice clinicians (e.g., Waxman et al, 1990). Hammond 
(1992) confirmed this finding by asking laypersons, 
novices, and subexperts to diagnose clients. Laypersons 
and novice counselors used specific symptoms to support 
their diagnoses of case scenarios while subexperts cited 
past clinical experiences. It has been suggested that 
the neophyte counselor forms problem representations of 
clients differently than experienced counselors because 
of vulnerability to salient information (Dumont & 
Lecomte, 1987). Waxman et al. (1990) classified 
counseling psychologists as either novice or experts and 
had them "think aloud" by verbalizing preliminary and 
summary inferences about the client's problem areas as 
the case study was read. Novices were more likely to 
confirm initial hypotheses in the summary assessment and 
recall only that information which confirmed their 
hypotheses. In a large study (N=893) by Bernstein and 
Lecomte (1982) counselors, clinical social workers, and 
clinical psychologists confirmed that subjects at 
different points in training (beginning master's, ending 
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master's, and post-master's professional) make different 
judgments about clients. Subjects completed the 
Therapist Expectancy Inventory about a male or an 
identical female client. Results indicated that ending 
students had the highest expectancy of positive 
therapeutic outcomes while professional counselors had 
the lowest expectancy. The beginning students 
anticipated the offering of more interpretations than the 
ending students and professionals. These differences 
suggest that training level effects counselors' 
expectancies as a function of changing schemata. 
It is generally agreed that increased expertise 
results in more accurate decision-making in a given 
occupation. However, experts and trainees alike are 
subject to biases and do not necessarily process 
information with the exactitude of a computer analysis. 
Research suggests that experts rely on their past 
experiences and use heuristics in clinical decision-
making more than novices. Novices are susceptible to 
error as a result of an exaggeration of salient cues and 
novices rely heavily on that information which is 
consistent with self-schema. If trained social 
information processors such as counselors are subject to 
biases, then the profession that strives to help people 
should address this issue. 
Current Directions 
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Authors have proposed that future research 
investigate how counselors engage in heuristics toward 
further understanding of potential clinical errors (e.g. , 
Heppner & Frazier, 1992; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For 
example, Fagley (1988) cautioned school psychologists 
about possible errors in judgment as a function of the 
availability, representative, and anchoring heuristics, 
but no quantitative work was presented. There seems to 
be a concern about cognitive heuristic error, but the 
lack of studies specific to counselors suggest a 
hesitancy to quantitatively explore this area. 
Statement of Purpose and Hypothesis 
Research suggests that clinical decision-making is 
neither free from biases nor is it necessarily logical. 
An understanding of a counselor's heuristics processes 
necessitates an understanding of self-schema which 
concurrently influence decision-making. Experts and 
novices alike are prone to subjectivity that eventually 
leads to judgmental errors. As a helping profession, 
counseling should to address the sources and effects that 
biases have on the client. 
The purpose of this research was to investigate 
whether self-schema affects the diagnostic process of 
counselors-in-training. Specifically, counselors' 
sensitivity to sexual orientation was assessed with 
respect to the likelihood and severity that a gay client 
17 
had a mental illness. Using counselors with high and low 
levels of training allowed for the assessment of the 
effects of expertise. 
Graduate counseling students with varying levels of 
education and clinical experience were asked to read a 
case study. Half the subjects read a vignette about a 
dysthymic, gay male client (sexual orientation as the 
salient cue) and the other half read an identical 
vignette about a male client (sexual orientation not 
salient). Subjects then rated the likelihood and the 
corresponding severity of seven defined diagnoses to 
indicate the degree to which the client had a mental 
illness. To quantify schema about gays/lesbians, 
participants completed a questionnaire assessing degree 
of homophobia. It was hypothesized that: 1) the 
likelihood and severity ratings that the client had a 
mental illness would be less for the more experienced 
counselors-i~-training group, 2) the likelihood and 
severity ratings that the client had a mental illness 
were associated with the degree of the counselor's 
homophobia, and 3) the likelihood and severity ratings 
that the client had a mental illness would be higher for 
the gay male versus the male client. 
Given that the predicted effects are statistically 
significant, intervention at the training stage of 
counseling would be preferable. A program that increases 
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awareness of biases or even counteracts the effects of 
heuristics could be designed. Turk and Salovey (1986) 
suggested that "strategies such as focusing attention on 
one's own cognitive processes, careful self-
interrogation, generation of competing hypotheses, and 
careful record keeping might decrease biases in 
information processing" (cited in Heppner & Frazier, 
1992, p. 166). A discussion of teaching techniques to 
minimalize error will be presented in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Participants 
To investigate how counselors-in-training process 
social information, students seeking degrees in Community 
Counseling and Counseling Psychology were solicited. 
Sixty-two students signed a written consent form 
acknowledging their voluntary participation (see Appendix 
A). Thirty-nine subjects were women and 23 were men. 
The mean age was 25.8 with standard deviation of 5.0. 
Forty-six subjects were enrolled in a terminal master's 
program and 16 were enrolled in a Ph.D. program. 
Design 
A 2 x 2 factorial design was employed. The between-
subjects factors were: level of experience and version of 
the case study. Each factor contained two groups: (1) 
high versus low level of training and (2) sexual 
orientation salient versus sexual orientation not 
salient. 
Independent Variables 
Training levels were divided into low and high 
groups based on the subject's program and the number of 
clients counseled. The low level of training group 
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consisted of master's students without any counseling 
experience. The high level of training group consisted 
of master's students with some counseling experience (at 
least one client) and all students in the doctoral 
program. The subjects were divided again according to 
the version of the case study they received. Form A 
presented a salient cue about the client's sexual 
orientation while Form B did not contain a salient cue 
about sexual orientation. 
The case study was modified from an example in the 
DSM-III-R Case Book (Spitzer, Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, 
& First, 1989). The "Junior Executive" (p. 37) exhibits 
symptoms and criteria for Axis I: 300.40 Dysthymia, 
Primary Type, Early Onset. For increased effects of 
saliency for Form A, the client's sexual orientation was 
included in the opening sentence. The original 
description was changed from a female client to a gay 
male client and stereotypical information (i.e., he did 
not participate in sports) about gay males was added to 
the description. Such information was consistent with 
the inversion model of homosexuality which states that 
people attribute feminine qualities to gay males and 
masculine qua! i ties to lesbians (Kite & Deaux, 19 8 7) . 
Form A was the revised case study (see Appendix c) 
described above and Form B was identical with the 
21 
exception of the first sentence which described the 
client as a "male" instead of "gay male." 
Measures 
A diagnostic questionnaire (see Appendix D) was 
developed to assess the degree to which counselors-in-
training conceptualized the case study as having a mental 
illness. The questionnaire provided a list of seven 
potential diagnoses and their definitions selected from 
the DSM-III-R Manual. The seven mental illness areas 
were: (1) Major Depression, (2) Identity Disorder, (3) 
Social Anxiety, (4) Alcohol/Drug Dependence, (5) Sexual 
Dysfunction, (6) Dysthymia, and (7) Personality 
Disorders. Participants rated the likelihood of having 
the specific mental illness using a seven-point scale 
from 0 (none) to 6 (very). The sum of the seven ratings 
served as the dependent measure of the degree to which a 
counselor-in-training evaluated the client as having a 
mental illness. Using the same seven criteria, 
participants were also instructed to rate the severity of 
the mental illness using a seven-point scale from 0 (not) 
to 6 (very). The sum of the severity ratings was used as 
the dependent measure of the participant's perception of 
the severity of the mental illness. 
A 15 item questionnaire (see Appendix E) to assess 
one's attitudes toward gays/ lesbians provided information 
about pre-existing schema on homophobia. Walker and 
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Antaki (1986) found sexual orientation effective in 
accessing stereotypical categories and found negative 
attitudes toward homosexuals affected how information was 
recalled. Subjects were asked to indicate the degree of 
agreement/disagreement from 0-6, respectively, on each of 
the 15 questions. Eight questions from the scale 
developed by Begin (1981) were used following the example 
of Dupres, Levy, Samson, and Tessier (1989). In their 
large study (N=407) they borrowed questions from Begin's 
survey to assess homophobia and its effect on attitudes 
about AIDS. Because counselors-in-training are expected 
to be more tolerant than the general population of 
varying sexual orientations, cultures, races, and values, 
seven additional questions to differentiate between lower 
levels of the tolerance were written by the author in the 
style of Begin (e.g. , "I would have a sexual relationship 
with someone who has had homosexual intercourse)." The 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations of the 15 questions 
(See Appendix E) indicate significant association at the 
.OS and .01 levels between most questions. 
Procedure 
Subjects read the case study and completed the 
questionnaires in a group format or individually. For 
those participants receiving the experiment in a group, 
instructions were given verbally by the principal 
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investigator. For those who participated individually, 
written instructions were provided (see Appendix F). 
A set of three 8" x 11.5" manilla envelopes numbered 
1-3 and marked with (form) A or B were handed out at 
random to each subject. The first envelope contained 
instructions to read the case through one time and when 
finished to replace it in Envelope #1 before opening 
Envelope #2. Envelope #2 instructed the subject to fill 
out the requested demographic information then fill out 
a questionnaire about the case study. The placement of 
the information sheet served as a distracting task to 
empty the case study from short term memory before 
beginning the questionnaire. Also, information used in 
the calculation of experience was obtained. Subjects 
were asked to replace all materials back into Envelope #2 
and continue with Envelope #3. Envelope #3 contained a 
measure of homophobia. Following the completion of the 
questionnaires, the participants received a written 
debriefing (see Appendix G). 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
A 2 (high versus low level of training) X 2 (sexual 
orientation as salient versus not salient) multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with degree of 
homophobia as the covariate was conducted. The 
likelihood of h~ving a mental illness ratings and the 
severity associated with having a mental illness ratings 
served as the dependent variables. 
The descriptive data, including a display of the 
means and standard deviations for the composite 
likelihood and severity ratings by training level and 
salience with correspondent measures on the homophobic 
questionnaire, is provided in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Results of the MANOVA indicated a main effect for 
level of counselor experience, Wilks F = 4.590, p < .014. 
Univariate analyses of variance suggested that level of 
training was related to both the likelihood ratings that 
the client had a mental illness, F(l,56) = 5.11, p <.028, 
and the severity ratings of mental illness, F(l,56) = 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the 
MAN COVA 
Independent Variables 
Form A (gay, male) Form B (male) 
Mean Std N Mean Std N 
Likelihood 
Low Training 26.36 6.70 11 26.92 6.47 12 
High Training 23.19 5.23 21 23.18 5.27 17 
Severity 
Low Training 25.55 8.48 11 25.75 6.47 12 
High Training 20.18 6.86 21 21. 00 5.22 17 
Degree of Homophobia 
Low Training 1. 73 1.14 11 1.48 .57 12 
High Training 1. 30 .95 21 1.25 .73 17 
9.52, p < .003. 
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Examination of the means (Table 1) 
indicated that the low level of training group was more 
likely to rate the client as having a mental illness and 
rated the mental illness more severely than the 
counselors in the high level of training group. 
There was a significant within groups effect for 
attitudes about gay sexual orientation F = 3 .13, p < 
.052. A regression analysis between the homophobic 
questionnaire and the dependent variables indicated that 
greater homophobic attitudes were associated with lower 
severity of mental illness ratings, beta = -.252, t = 
-1.95, p < .057, eta2 = .063. There was not a 
significant effect for the likelihood of having a mental 
illness. 
There were no significant between group main effects 
for the salience of the client's gay orientation, and 
there was no interaction effect for salience of sexual 
orientation and experience level of the counselor. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Level of Experience 
As predicted, level of experience affected how the 
client was diagnosed. More experienced counselors rated 
the gay male and male client significantly less likely to 
have any of the seven diagnoses than the less experienced 
counselors. The more experienced counselors also rated 
the severity of the diagnoses for the gay male and male 
client less than the unexperienced counselors. 
The explanations of this finding are understood in 
terms of self-schema. Experience can be defined as 
greater depth and breadth of knowledge (Gebotys, & 
Claxton-Oldfield, 1989) or a more expansive schema. The 
more experienced clinician has a larger number of past 
expectancies and more complex prototype for a ( dysthymic) 
client. The likelihood and severity ratings of more 
experienced counselors-in-training are based on a broader 
schema of mental illness than those with less experiences 
and the importance of the salient information is less 
exaggerated. The novice counselor has a limited schema 
and improperly weights the significance of presented 
information; (Dumont & Lecomte, 1987) therefore, the 
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likelihood and severity ratings for the counselors with 
less training were higher. 
The less likely and less severe ratings of the 
client having a mental illness ratings by more 
experienced counselors-in-training are consistent with 
the expert-novice literature. Experience level has been 
found to influence expectancies about how a client was 
diagnosed, prognosed, and processed (Bernstein & Lecomte, 
1982), but the finding of this experiment provides 
evidence on the specifics of that influence. This result 
indicates that there is a negative relationship between 
level of experience and the rated likelihood and severity 
of a client having a mental illness. 
If such a small difference in experience (the 
minimum being counseling one client) can affect how one 
views the client, then educational institutions should 
respond by evaluating their training programs. If novice 
counselors attend to salient information and incorrectly 
weigh it in the decision-making process, then students 
must be alerted to this tendency. Furthermore, their 
limited knowledge base requires training that gives more 
examples of various types of clients in order to expand 
schema. 
This finding does not allow us to interpret the 
correctness of the likelihood and severity ratings for 
more experienced counselors-in-training versus the less 
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experienced counselors. Even professional counselors with 
several years of experience are prone to biases. 
However, the establishment of reliable ratings for the 
likelihood and severity of mental illness for this case 
study would provide a basis for the comparison of 
correctness. Currently, the interpretation of the 
effects of expertise is limited to comparisons of 
differences rather than comparisons of accuracy. 
Effects of Schema 
The degree of homophobia was associated with 
differences in the severity ratings of mental illness for 
both high and low levels of training. Specifically, as 
degree of homophobia increased the severity of mental 
illness ratings decreased. Degree of homophobia was not 
associated with differences in the likelihood of mental 
illness rating. 
There is a trend toward understanding and an 
absence of bias toward people of various race, ethnicity, 
and sexual orientation. The helping professions have 
recently began to acknowledge cultural issues as an 
explanation of behavior rather than an attribution of 
pathology. Entire courses have been devoted to 
counseling clients who are not white, middle class, and 
heterosexual. Although such classes have began to alert 
counselor trainees to potential biases, that does not 
mean that counselors-in-training are able to eliminate 
biases. 
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Rudolph (1990) found that graduate counseling 
students do not necessarily view homosexuality as 
pathological nor do they deny homosexuals their civil 
rights, but subjects were not asked to diagnose the 
client. Given, the sensitivity of homophobia as well as 
racism or sexism, there is the possibility that more 
homophobic counselors attempted to hide their biases by 
underestimating the severity of the client's symptoms. 
This phenomenon is often called "faking good." Bernstein 
and Lecomte (1989) support this explanation. They found 
that the characteristics of the counselor affected 
expectations about a client rather 
characteristics of the client (gender). 
than the 
The tendency of counselors with more homophobia to 
underestimate the severity of a client's mental illness 
has not been previously researched, therefore such a 
finding is important. Establishing that counselors have 
varying degrees i:1f homophobia which may ef feet the client 
necessitates research investigating at what degree 
homophobia becomes potentially harmful to homosexual 
clients. Currently, there is no cross-sectional 
information about the level of homophobia in the United 
States. Future research should focus on assessing 
homophobia to provide a context for comparison. A large 
scale, cross cultural study of attitudes toward 
homosexuality would provide the "norm attitude" 
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information necessary to make comparisons between groups 
(i.e., counselors versus laypersons). 
Effects of Experience with Schema 
The third hypothesis predicted there would be a 
difference in the likelihood and severity ratings between 
the gay male client and the male client for both low 
level of training and high level of training, but it was 
not supported. As evidenced by the insignificance of the 
salient cue, knowing the client's sexuality did not 
influence the likelihood and severity ratings for low and 
high levels of training. 
An explanation of the insignificance of sexual 
orientation can be considered in terms of a statistical 
limitation. The effect size and power of salience 
suggest that the case study descriptions may not be 
strong enough to elicit discriminating responses. A 
stronger questionnaire may have produced significant 
differences. It is also possible that the definitions of 
experience used in this study could not detect biases for 
this particular effect. 
This finding is not consistent with research on the 
effects of homosexuality on case conceptualization. 
Davidson and Friedman (1981) found that a person's 
psychological problems were rated more severely on DSM-II 
diagnoses if the client was homosexual. However, their 
study used subjects in an undergraduate, introductory 
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psychology class so their level of expertise was lower 
than that of the subjects in this thesis experiment. 
Social cognitive literature would have expected the gay 
male client to be have a higher likelihood of diagnoses 
and higher severity rating because of the negative 
stereotypes held about gays. The presentation of a 
salient cue increases the likelihood that heuristic 
processes are used (Whittler, 1989). Furthermore, sexual 
orientation has been an effective salient cue for 
accessing stereotypic categories (Walker & Antaki, 1986) 
and knowing a person belongs to a stereotyped group 
increases stereotypic attributions (Gurwitz & Dodge, 
1977). Although the form used to assess the effects of 
salient sexual orientation on the diagnoses of the client 
was designed in accordance with past research, it did not 
elicit any significant differences between likelihood and 
severity of mental illness ratings. 
Despite the insignificance of salience, counselors-
in-training are not immune with respect to sexual 
orientation. Such a generalization would be tempting, 
but not necessarily accurate. This finding does suggest 
that between the low and high level of training defined 
in the method section, sexual orientation is not a 
discriminating factor for the explanation of differences 
between the likelihood and severity that a client has a 
mental illness. Research with a larger sample size and 
a validated questionnaire would 
interpretation of this finding. 
clarify 
General Implications of the Study 
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The study suggests that cognitive heuristic 
processes can be understood in conjunction with other 
cognitive structures as influential in the case 
conceptualization of clients. Heuristics may result in 
harmful errors because the self-schema which organizes 
the incoming information biases the resulting judgments. 
The counseling profession has debated the clinician's 
ability to put aside their own personal thoughts and 
feelings in the therapeutic relationship. Although the 
"tabula rasa" notion is no longer popular, an acceptance 
of biases or errors in judgment is not widespread. Until 
recently, the early cautions of Meehl (1954) have been 
ignored. 
There is a lack of established measures of self-
schema. Research should develop measurements of 
homophobia, sexism, racism, etc. This would allow for 
comparisons of biases between groups and with a norm 
group. Without valid and reliable tools of measurement 
a serious investigation of counselor biases cannot 
proceed. 
Given that self-schema interact with cognitive 
heuristics to affect the case conceptualization process, 
educational institutions need to respond. According to 
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Fischhoff, explaining heuristic processes and their 
potential for judgmental biases is not enough to prevent 
heuristic use or resulting errors (cited in Sherman & 
Corty, 1984), but others (e.g., Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 
1975) believe it is a good starting point. Research by 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff; and Hoch (cited in 
Baron, 1990) has proven that the errors resulting from 
cognitive heuristics can be suppressed. Baron (1990) 
proposes that "actively open-minded thinking" can reduce 
overconfidence in decisions and nullify the schema 
preserving function. 
counterevidence and 
This approach promotes a search for 
allows for the expansion of 
categorical rules. Agnoli and Krantz (1989) had success 
counteracting heuristic error by extending the principles 
governing heuristic operations. They taught subjects 
problem-solving techniques to interrupt or slow the 
automaticity of heuristics. 
Gordon (cited in Sherman & 
Armstrong, Denniston, and 
Corty, 1984) required a 
presented question be broken into smaller questions less 
complex than the original. The integrated answers were 
more accurate. 
Limitations of the Study 
The study had a limited sample size and participants 
were from one counseling psychology program. Whether 
these findings are consistent with other counseling 
psychology programs as well as clinical social work and 
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clinical psychology programs remains to seen. 
Differences in program curricula and theoretical 
orientation may influence the development of counselors-
in-training. Also, the doctoral students were not 
monitored when they completed the experiment. They may 
have referred back to the case or read it more than once 
despite instructions to do otherwise. The environment in 
which they performed the experiment may have been more 
distracting than the quiet classroom conditions 
experienced by master's students. These differences must 
be considered when assessing the validity of the 
experiment. 
Statistically, there is some question about the 
differences in subject numbers between the low level and 
high level of training groups. The distribution of the 
number of client's counseled necessitated an uneven split 
between the two groups. Whether or not this affects the 
interpretability of the F statistic was not evident in 
either the assumptions of homogeniety or the post-hoc 
testing, but it remains an area of concern. 
Although the homophobic measure had high 
associations between questions suggesting construct 
validity, no reliability or validity was established 
before its use in the experiment. Lack of criterion-
related validity may have contributed to its failure to 
confirm that the likelihood ratings of a client having a 
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mental illness increased with level of homophobia. 
Further complications may have resulted from social 
desirability bias because homophobia is a very sensitive 
issue. This measurement needs additional testing using 
a broader population sample to establish reliability and 
validity data. 
Future Directions 
In what other ways do cognitive heuristic and 
cognitive structures affect the client. There are many 
other components to therapy besides diagnoses. How do 
initial judgments affect the outcome of therapy? How are 
they related to specific theoretical orientations? Are 
certain clients more affected by the counselor's self-
serving biases than other clients? 
What about the counselor's characteristics as an 
influence on the decision-making process? A counselor's 
clinical experience is just one of the many 
characteristics to be addressed. What about race, gender, 
age, SES? 
In regard to cognitive heuristics per se, research 
specifying the type cognitive heuristic (i.e., anchoring) 
within an integrative framework may provide more clues 
about its specific errors in the therapeutic process. By 
doing so, the particular operations of each type of 
heuristic can be paired with previously established 
results. For example, were the differences in severity 
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ratings a function of the representative or availability 
heuristic? 
After research has amassed more knowledge about 
biases when performing counseling activities, then more 
information is needed about the generalizability of these 
findings? Do these process take place in the actual 
therapy session? 
exploration. 
Clearly, this area is wide open for 
Summary 
Laypersons do not always make statistically correct 
decisions. Counselors are not beyond inaccurate 
decision-making, and in fact they often rely on cognitive 
heuristics in order to make more timely judgments. The 
potential for systematic errors exists as a function of 
the inherent subjectivity of the counselor. The effects 
of self-schema (subjectivity) on the organization of 
information have been demonstrated in the differences in 
diagnoses of a gay, male client. Homosexuality is just 
one area that personal values, beliefs, and pre-existing 
expectancies can influence the counselor's reactions to 
a client. If the counseling profession is to achieve 
their goal of helping others, then training and education 
to make counselors effective with clients of all types is 
necessary. 
APPENDIX A 
CONSENT FORM 
Counselors and the Process of Case Conceptualization 
A case scenario will be presented to the subject. 
The subject will the engage in a simple listening task 
and then he/she will then be asked to answer questions 
pertaining to case information. An attitude questionnaire 
will follow. 
I, _________ state that I am over 18 years of 
age and that I wish to participate in the research 
project being conducted by Kelly Arduino, Master's 
candidate. I have had the procedures in which I will 
participate explained to me, and have been informed that 
I may withdraw from participation at any time without 
prejudice. 
I understand that there is no risk for physical or 
emotional injury and that in no way will my name or any 
identifying information be connected with the data 
collected. Should I have any further questions regarding 
the research conducted, I may contact the investigator, 
Kelly Arduino at (312) 275-6248. 
In the event that I believe I have suffered any 
discrimination or harm, I may contact the Chairperson of 
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the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of 
Human Subjects for the Lake Shore, Water Tower, 
Mallinckrodt campuses of Loyola University 
(telephone:[312] 508-2471). 
I freely and voluntarily consent to participation in 
this research project. 
(Signature of S~bject) (Date) 
What is your age? 
APPENDIX B 
INFORMATION SHEET 
What is your theoretical orientation? 
How many clients have you counseled? 
0 <10 <25 <50 >50 
What year are you in your current program? 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 
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APPENDIX C 
CASE STUDY 
A 28 year old, white gay male was referred to the 
agency for indi victual therapy. He has obtained a 
master's degree in business administration and moved to 
California a year and a half earlier to begin work in a 
large firm. He complained of being "depressed" about 
everything: his job, his most current relationship, and 
his prospects for the future. 
He has received extensive psychotherapy in the past. 
He had seen an "analyst" twice a week for three years 
while in college, and a "behaviorist" for a year and a 
half while in graduate school. His complaints were of 
persistent feelings of depressed mood, inferiority, and 
pessimism, which he claims to have had since 16 or 17. 
Although he did reasonably well in college, he 
consistently ruminated about those students who were 
"genuinely intelligent." He claimed that therapy helped, 
but he could not remember a time when he didn't feel 
depressed. 
He had several sexual partners during college and 
graduate school, but claimed that he would never go after 
anyone he thought was "special," always feeling inferior 
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and intimidated. Whenever he saw or met a potentially 
"special" 
partner, he acted aloof and stiff, or actually walked 
away as quickly as possible, only to berate himself 
afterward and then fantasize about that person for many 
months. 
Client is an only child from an intact family. He 
states he is close with his mother and talks with her on 
the phone at least twice a week. His feels afraid of and 
distant from his father, whom he describes as a 
"workaholic" and rarely around during his childhood. 
Client went to a small rural high school where sports 
were very important, and because he did not participate 
in them felt shunned and left out by others. He dated a 
couple women in high school, but very briefly. The client 
stated he had a male English teacher who was his "first 
real friend" and encouraged him to go onto college, even 
though the client didn't feel he would be able to get 
accepted. 
Recently, he has been having difficulty at work. He 
is assigned to the most menial tasks at the firm and is 
never given an assignment of any importance or 
responsibility. He admits that he frequently does a 
"slipshod" job of what is given him, never does more than 
is required, and never demonstrates any assertiveness or 
initiative to his supervisors. He views his boss as 
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self-centered, unconcerned, and unfair, but nevertheless 
admires his success. He feels that he will never go very 
far in his profession because he does not have the right 
"connections," and yet he dreams of money, status, and 
power. 
Under the burden of his dissatisfaction with his 
current relationship, his job, and lack of a social life, 
feeling tired and uninterested in "life", he now seeks 
treatment for the third time. 
APPENDIX D 
DIAGNOSTIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
The following is a list of the instructions and 
diagnoses which were rated on a scale 0-6. In terms of 
diagnosis, read the following DSM-III-R definitions for 
common mental disorders. 
1) INDICATE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A GIVEN DIAGNOSIS MAY 
CHARACTERIZE THE CLIENT'S DIFFICULTIES. 
2) INDICATE THE SEVERITY OF THE DIAGNOSIS. 
MAJOR DEPRESSION: Has had a Major Depressive Episode 
which lasts at least 6 months. Has never had a Manic 
Episode or an unequivocal Hypomanic Episode. 
IDENTITY DISORDER: Severe subjective distress regarding 
uncertainty about a variety of issues. 
SOCIAL ANXIETY: Uneasiness in a situation which involves 
social interaction. 
ALCOHOL/DRUG DEPENDENCE: A state, psychic and sometimes 
physical, resulting from taking drugs/alcohol 
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characterized by behavioral and other responses that 
always includes a compulsion to take a drugs/drink on a 
continuous or periodic basis. 
SEXUAL DYSFUNCTION: Inhibition in the appetitive or 
psychophysiologic changes that characterize the sexual 
response cycle. 
DYSTHYMIA: Chronic disturbance of mood involving 
depressed mood, for most of the day more days than not, 
for at least 2 years. 
PERSONALITY DISORDERS: Deeply ingrained patterns of 
behavior generally recognizable in adolescence or earlier 
and continuing throughout most of adult life. The 
personality is abnormal wither in the balance of its 
components, their quality and expression, or in its total 
aspect. 
APPENDIX E 
HOMOPHOBIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
The subject rated the following questions from strongly 
agree (0) to strongly disagree (6). 
1. Homosexuality is a mental illness. 
2. Homosexuality is a natural expression of one's 
sexual preference. 
3. It is acceptable to have interactions with 
gays/lesbians. 
4. Gays/lesbians generally detest the opposite sex. 
5. If found out my best friend was gay/lesbian that 
would not change our friendship. 
6. A relationship between gay/lesbians is as authentic 
and "deep" as a heterosexual relationship. 
7. If my son or daughter was gay/lesbian, I would 
accept his or her lovers without a problem. 
8. I would accept the teacher of my child, if they 
were gay/lesbian. 
9. I feel sorry for people who choose to lead a 
gay/lesbian lifestyle. 
10. I think it is acceptable for gay/lesbian couples to 
raise children. 
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11. If think gays/lesbians should be accepted in the 
military. 
12. I would have difficulty counseling a gay/lesbian 
client. 
13. I do not feel that gay/lesbians should have the 
same rights as heterosexual couples. 
14. Human beings are meant to be heterosexual. 
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15. I would have a sexual relationship with someone who 
has had homosexual intercourse. 
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TABLE E-1 
PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS FOR HOMOPHOBIC 
QUESTIONS NUMBERS 1-S 
Gayl Gay2 Gay3 Gay4 
Gayl 1.000 .SOO** .323* .2SO 
Gay2 .SOl** 1.000 .404** .34S** 
Gay3 .323* .404** 1. 000 .2S3* 
Gay4 .2SO .34S** .2S3* 1. 000 
Gays .298** .197 .140 .323* 
Gay6 .490** .422** .S4S** .1S2 
Gay7 .468** .S60** .344** .293* 
Gay8 .42S** .492** .320* .037 
Gay9 .326*. .393** .08S .366** 
GaylO .SSS** .S73** .364** .1S4 
Gayll .180 .429** .268* .173 
Gay12 .624-A* .430** .069 .2S7* 
Gay13 .360** .360** .214 .074 
Gay14 .139 .219 .142 .048 
GaylS .2Sl* .281* .277* .234 
*indicates significance at the .OS level 
**indicates significance at the .01 level 
Gays 
.298 
.198 
.140 
.323* 
1. 000 
.278* 
.494** 
.288* 
.040 
.393** 
.317* 
.33S** 
.313* 
-.006 
.188 
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TABLE E-2 
PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS FOR HOMOPHOBIC 
QUESTIONS NUMBERS 6-10 
Gay6 Gay7 Gay8 Gay9 
Gayl .490** .468** .42S** .326* 
Gay2 .422** .S60** .492** .393** 
Gay3 .S4S** .344** .320* .08S 
Gay4 .1S2 .293* .037 .366** 
Gays .278* .494** .288* .040 
Gay6 1. 000 .S72** .S40** .189 
Gay7 .S72** 1. 000 .6SS** .243 
Gay8 .S40** .6SS** 1. 000 .222 
Gay9 .189 .243 .222 1. 000 
GaylO .476** .S96** .S77** . 217 
Gayll .373** .S3S** .468** .170 
Gay12 .398** .278** .313* .36S** 
Gay13 .339** .473** .434** .233 
Gay14 .299* .394** .332** .242 
GaylS .142 .339** .279* .176 
*indicates significance at the .OS level 
**indicates significance at the .01 level 
GaylO 
.SSS** 
.S73** 
.364** 
.1S4 
.393** 
.476** 
.S96** 
.S77** 
.217 
1. 000 
.S33** 
.332** 
.609** 
.18S 
.439** 
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TABLE E-3 
PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS FOR HOMOPHOBIC 
QUESTIONS NUMBERS 11-lS 
Gayll Gay12 Gay13 Gay14 
Gayl .180 .624** .360** .139 
Gay2 .429** .430** .3S9** .219 
Gay3 .268* .069 .214 .142 
Gay4 .173 .2S7* .074 .048 
Gays .317* .33S** .313* -.006 
Gay6 .373** .398** .339** .299* 
Gay7 .S3S** .278* .473* .394** 
Gay8 .468** .313* .434** .332** 
Gay9 .170 .36S** .233 .242 
GaylO .S33** .332** .609** .18S 
Gayll 1.000 .31S* .480** .233 
Gay12 .31S* 1. 000 .32S** -.003 
Gay13 .480** .32S** 1. 000 .204 
Gay14 .233 -.003 .204 1. 000 
GaylS .242 .lOS .310* .273* 
*indicates significance at the .OS level 
**indicates significance at the .01 level 
GaylS 
.2Sl* 
.281* 
.278* 
.234 
.188 
.142 
.339** 
.277* 
.176 
.439** 
.242 
.lOS 
.310* 
.273* 
1.000 
APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTION SHEET 
I ask that you read the following instructions very 
carefully before proceeding. This should take no more 
than 20 minutes of your time. 
Before you begin, I have enclosed a consent form which 
formally states that you will be at no risk by 
participating in this project and you understand as much. 
Please read and sign this for my records. It will be 
separated from your data upon the receipt of this 
project. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
I. You should have 3 envelopes with a code letter and 
number combination on each envelope. If you do not have 
all three do not complete the experiment and call the 
researcher. 
II. Take out the contents of the first envelope, read and 
follow the instructions enclosed. The contents of the 
envelopes are separated for a reason, so please do not 
refer back to any envelope after replacing its contents. 
III. Open envelope #2 and fill out the demographic data. 
51 
52 
In the top right hand corner after "CODE." Please put 
300 and then an "M" for male or a "F" for female as is 
appropriate. Turn to the next page, read the instructions 
and begin with the questionnaire. 
IV. Follow the instructions provided at the end of 
questionnaire #2 and open envelope #3. 
V. After you have completed the questionnaire, place all 
three envelopes along with the consent form in the box in 
the CEPS reception area above the faculty mailboxes. It 
will be marked KA THESIS. At the bottom of that box 
there will be an envelope marked debriefing. You are 
welcome to take a copy of the debriefing, and as it 
states give me a call if you have any questions. 
I realize that everyone is very busy, but I would prefer 
that you could have the completed study turned in within 
seven days. It will help me to have all my data 
collected and enable me to begin the data entry process. 
THANKS AGAIN FOR PARTICIPATING. 
Kelly Arduino 
(312)275-6248 
APPENDIX G 
DEBRIEFING 
The experiment in which you just participated is 
theoretically based on an information processing 
principle called "cognitive heuristic". Cognitive 
heuristic are shortcuts in information processing that 
indi victuals use in order to reduce complex problem-
sol ving when making uncertain judgments (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Cognitive heuristic are necessary 
because they allow one to organize large amounts of 
information in a timely manner; however, the heuristic 
process often leads to errors in judgment (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980). Accuracy and thoroughness of a judgement 
are complicated by such conditions as: time limitation, 
complexity and/or volume of relevant information, and 
uncertainty about the information (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Personal values and beliefs or pre-existing expectations 
can affect this process, and lead to faulty judgments due 
to an overreliance on non-relevant information, (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). As a consequence, individuals make 
adequate decisions rather than a "rational" decision 
(March & Simon, 1958), based on presented evidence and 
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probability. 
As counselors, we are in a situation parallel to the 
conditions defined above. An intake session gathers 
information similar to the case you read for the 
experiment. I am interested in what information 
counselor-trainees do attend to and how they judge the 
importance of that information in identifying the 
client's issues, conceptualizing the client, and 
diagnosing the client. 
To further assess the cognitive heuristic processes 
when a very salient cue is included, half of the subjects 
were told that the client was gay (salient cue) and half 
(control group) were not; the homophobic questionnaire 
assessed pre-existing values and beliefs. I will be 
giving this to master's, and doctoral students to study 
the effects of experience. 
It follows that if the counseling profession better 
understands how cognitive heuristic work in their field, 
we may investigate ways of guarding against any faulty 
judgments which may effect the client. 
If you have any further questions or comments about 
my thesis, I can be reached at (312)275-6248. I will be 
glad to talk with anyone about it. Thanks again for your 
participation. 
Kelly Arduino 
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